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  Biased by over seventy years of acquired preconceptions, I will  
  discuss mainly PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES, with occasional references to  
  CONSCIOUSNESS LOST AND FOUND.  The bottom line is that the  
  neuroscience oriented reader is more likely to benefit from LOST AND  
  FOUND than from DEBATES. DEBATES  is a profusely footnoted  
  tome.[McGinn's chapter 33 has a text of 11 pages and three  
  (repeat,three) pages of footnotes, Guzeldere's very helpful  
  introduction has 45 pages of text and 22 pages of footnotes]. 
 
  DEBATES   provides an overview of what three dozen contemporary 
  philosophers, writing in English, have to say about consciousness.  
  Readers will be exposed to much meticulous (even lawyerly)  
  argumentation and you may enjoy the self-confident manner in which  
  these philosophers make their moves and countermoves.  Consider Lycan,  
  "I am not here addressing issues of qualia or phenomenal character,  
  which I have resolved almost entirely satisfactorily elsewhere" (p.  
  756). Some readers may want to know what Lycan has so happily  
  resolved. A quale (singular) is a "raw feel" or "immediate sensation"  
  or "phenomenal experience" and for many modern philosophers it is the  
  indispensable essence of consciousness.  [according to the Oxford  
  English Dictionary a " quale " (rhymes,almost with folly or good  
  golly) means "the quality of a thing". See also Ramachandran and  
  Hirstein,1997)] In the index to DEBATES there are more references (48)  
  to qualia than to anything else including Cartesian materialism (21),  
  epiphenomenalism (22), functionalism (40), mental states (22), and  
  brain (5).  You can get a feel for what the word "qualia" means from  
  the contexts in which it appears. However, you may not bother if you  
  believe Dan Dennett, who in Chapter 40 argues that there are no such  
  things as qualia.  Even if there are, Lycan says. "I think qualia  
  problems and the nature of conscious awareness are mutually  
  independent and indeed have little to do with each other" (p. 756).   
  Lycan notwithstanding, Chapters 40-44 in this book on consciousness are 
entirely devoted to the nature of qualia. 
  DEBATES has fifty chapters, most of them reprinted from earlier  
  publications. There are ten sections, beginning with I.  Stream of  
  Consciousness.  This starts with a nice selection from William James 
  (1910) including his picture of awareness, not as a sharply edged  
  spotlight but as a more or less bell-shaped curve for each conscious  
  thought, followed not by an abrupt transition to the next thought but  
  rather by an overlap of the three curves: now, just past, and just  
  emerging.  "The waxing and waning brain processes at every moment  
  blend." The now-thought is surrounded by a halo of relationships  
  called by James "the fringe," discussed in detail recently by Galin  
  (1997).  Then follows II. Methodology, which contains Patricia  
  Churchland's rhetorical question entitling Chap. 7, "Can neurobiology  
  teach us anything about consciousness?" She gives reasons why the  
  answer is "yes". Surprisingly, however, "Not much," seems to be the  
  answer from most of the other philosophers.  Section III gives us  
  three psychologists (Baars, Farah, Shallice), one neurologist  
  (Bisiach) and two biologists (Crick and Koch). The 1990 essay by Crick  
  and Koch (Chapter 10), once indispensable reading for those interested  
  in the physiology of consciousness, has been succeeded by an article  
  (Crick and Koch, 1998) in which they summarize their 1990 essay and  
  review more recent developments.  They reiterate their expectation  
  that there will be one, or at most a few consciousness mechanisms;  
  Farah and Bisiach strongly differ. Both Farah and Bisiach cover  
  material (neglect, etc.) already known to neuropsychologists and  
  conclude that consciousness is, in Bisiach's words, "Far from being  
  unitary" and "rests entirely on a virtual mechanism distributed over  
  brain circuits." Farah asserts, "There is currently no evidence for a  
  dedicated awareness system distinct from the systems that perform  
  specific perceptual or cognitive functions."  By contrast, it seems to  
  others, (Baars, 1993; Shallice, in DEBATES, Chap. 13; Schacter, 1989;  
  Bogen, 
  1993,1997a) that there is evidence for a dedicated awareness system.  Time 
  will tell.  Meanwhile, since no brain  mechanism, focal or global, for 
  consciousness is yet widely accepted, there seems to remain considerable 
  room for the sort of metaphysical debates which, before the double helix, 
  dealt with the nature of life. 
 
 Before leaving behind the opinions of Bisiach  ['a virtual mechanism distributed over brain 
circuits'] and Farah [ no "system distinct from the systems that perform specific perceptual or 
cognitive functions"], I would suggest that these views as well as those of most philosophers 
seem to suppose that consciousness develops out of mentation rather than having an 
independent origin. The latter possibility is suggested by our awareness of nausea, sweetness, 
shortness-of-breath and other qualia requiring little if any cognition. In this view, consciousness is 
sufficiently basic or primitive  that trying to understand  consciousness by studying cognition is 
like trying to understand respiration by studying speech. 
 
  After Section III, for the remaining 36 chapters it's harangues and  
  polemics all the way.  An example is Dennet's fusillade at Ned Block's  
  big idea (distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from access  
  consciousness).  "I for one found it difficult to keep track of the  
  tangle of objections and counter objections, exemptions, caveats and  
  promissory notes and will be interested to see if other commentators  
  can find their way into, and back out of, the maze Block has created."   
  Further on, "Block has done my theory a fine service: nothing could  
  make [my theory] easier to swallow than Block's involuntary  
  demonstration of the pitfalls one must encounter if one turns one's  
  back on [my theory] and tries to take Block's purported distinction  
  seriously" (p. 417).  Block is capable of a similar tone:  "Harman's  
  primary argument is, as far as I can see, an appeal to-of all  
  things-introspection . . . an error in philosophical method . . . this  
  is no way to do philosophy" (p. 429). There is a familiar ring to  
  these sallies and ripostes_one hears them in court or in depositions  
  as attorneys snap and bark at each other during the proceedings,  
  following which they all go out for a friendly lunch together.  Tyler  
  Burge (in Chap. 24) supports Block's big idea (that we have two kinds  
  of consciousness) but he does it in a style almost entirely  
  introspective!  Burge `fesses up in a fashion rarely found in 
  philosophers: "I do not know how to defend this view . . . .  But I find 
  it compelling" (p. 429).  Burge is also refreshingly frank when he says, 
  "What is important for my purposes is not whether these empirical 
  conjectures are  correct but that the distinctions mark conceptual 
  possibilities" (p. 433). 
  Conceptual analysis attains its most monarchial importance when 
  Frank Jackson suggests that physical explanations of the mental must begin 
  with an a priori account; this is another version of the view that one 
  must first adopt a metaphysical position before any serious evaluation of 
  data. [My favorite counter to this is from Sherrington (1947) where he 
  refers to the greatest neuroanatomist (Ramon y Cajal) telling how adhering 
  at one time or another to either dualism or materialism seemed to make no 
  difference whatever in his practical life. See also, Bogen,1998 for an 
  argument that the the metaphysical issue is orthogonal to the mind/brain 
  issue] . 
  In Chapter 29, Jackson considers how (indeed, even whether) mental 
  properties relate to the natural world.  Thus, even though neuropsychology 
  finds abundant evidence for mind having a physical (brain) basis, for 
  Jackson and friends this can never be enough.  They will insist that an a 
  priori account be given before evidence can be considered.  Like lawyers 
  who have accepted a retainer, they know which side they are on and will 
  not be cowed by any facts in the case. 
  One of the few philosophers in this tome to concern himself with 
  physiology (in this case, of pain) is Michael Tye; but see how he does it! 
  Tye considers one of Ned Block's pseudosyllogisms: 
  The pain is in my fingertip. 
  The fingertip is in my mouth. 
  Therefore, the pain is in my mouth. 
  Block claims that the nonsensical result of this supposed syllogism 
  results from the word "is" being used differently in the first of these 
  sentences.Tye explains why Block is wrong (to say the word "is" is 
  being used differently for pain) using the next nine pages.!!  Tye is well 
  aware that "pains in the upper left arm are often due to disturbances in 
  the heart."  And he says, "Pain experiences, if they are anywhere, are in 
  the head." How then can he say the word "is" is being used the same way in 
  each sentence?  Perhaps more troublesome is  his brief reference to the 
  elimination of distress by a frontal leukotomy (or cingulotomy):   "These 
  reports, even if taken at face value, are compatible with the proposal in 
  the text, for clearly such cases are abnormal." ( his Footnote 6 on page 
  339)  What boggles is not simply his doubts about a fact well known to any 
  neurosurgeon with relevant experience- what is more troublesome is  the 
  implication that his explanation of the normal should not be affected by 
  data from abnormal cases  (which would include much of the data from 
  neuropsychology).  Since any adequate theory of the normal should explain 
  the abnormal, how can he not be concerned about abnormal cases? 
 
  Out at another tail end of the philosophic distribution is Chapter 28  
  by Georges Rey, who denies that there is any such thing as  
  consciousness, in the sense that, "There would seem to be no actual  
  thing or process that our past usages have been `getting at'" (p.  
  473).  He quotes William James to the effect that consciousness is not  
  a thing, insisting instead that the word stands for a function.  [  
  this quote of James is in footnote 38(repeat 38) of the Rey article]  
  Most readers of this review might agree with James's point, but not  
  Rey who says, "When I say there may be no such thing, I mean no such  
  thing whatsoever" (p. 479).  Among his 132 references there are five  
  neuro-refs (Eccles, Luria, Moruzzi, Penfield, and Pribram) which he  
  mentions solely for the purpose of shrugging them off. The only neuro  
  opinion Rey favors is an assertion by a philosopher, Jerry  
  Fodor(1983). According to Fodor, input systems are highly modular,  
  including that  they are "encapsulated , i.e. not subject to "top  
  down" or other outside influence(p66).  By contrast, he wrote , "...  
  In the case of central processors you get an approach to universal  
  connectivity(p 119)[where] neural connectivity appears to go every  
  which way and the form/function correspondence appears to be  
  minimal"(p188). This is altogether outlandish! The first fact is that  
  input systems are subject to a variety of descending controls, from  
  cortex as well as from subcortical structures . The second fact is  
  that central connections are far from universal and there have been  
  shown a myriad of form/function correspondences. How could Fodor be so  
  misinformed?  Almost 20 years ago he and I shared the back seat of a  
  limousine taking us from Logan airport to a conference in the  
  Massachusett's woods.  During the hour long ride , about 45 minutes  
  consisted of Fodor's explaining that a scientific psychology has no  
  need of brain any more than using software requires a knowledge of  
  computer hardware.  This struck me as similar to claiming that a  
  scientific understanding of cars need not involve mechanical knowledge  
  just because people can drive cars without knowing engines,etc. (And  
  it may be a bit reminiscent of the old navy saying that the Navy Regs  
  [regulations] were designed by geniuses to be used by simpletons).   
  The point here is that Rey relies for his understanding of brain not  
  on a neuroscientist but on another philosopher who, it turns out, is  
  explicitly proud of not knowing about brain. Someone might say, " but  
  that was over two decades ago". Sadly, many philosophers have not  
  changed. In the spring of 1997, Owen Flanagan came to Caltech at the  
  invitation of Christof Koch. At dinner he mentioned that on leaving  
  Duke, he informed his philosophy colleagues that he might see some  
  neurolab or neurocase material. They recoiled in horror. . He may have  
  embellished the tale a bit but the message was clear-philosophers  
  (those anyway) don't dirty their hands with data-it might interfere  
  with their ability to evaluate other peoples' data. Is it really the  
  sad truth that natural philosophy (what we now call science) has so  
  far separated off from its origins that it has left behind only  
  papyrologists--people who take paper in, put paper out, and while  
  reading and writing  assiduously, earnestly avoid the tangible? Do  
  they consider direct contact with data to be of negative value?  Are  
  they, like some redneck in the play Tobacco Road, actually proud of  
  their ignorance? . What seems to me another example of the extent to which many philosophers 
are disdainful of neuroanatomic detail is reflected in Lycan's assertion: "the central nervous 
system is as central as it gets" (p. 762). 
   
  Flanagan (1992, excerpted in chap. 19) can be rewarding because he  
  explains how other philosophers are wrong and he does it in a readable  
  style.  Unfortunately, even Flanagan reveals a surprising  
  neuroignorance. It seems that philosophers are still devoting time to  
  whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal.  This is the idea that  
  consciousness is like heart sounds.  The sounds can tell us some of  
  what is going on in our hearts (just as consciousness can tell us some  
  of what is going on in our 
  brains) but the sounds don't have any effect on the function of the heart. 
  To explain epiphenomenality, Flanagan contrasts two pictures:  in the 
  first, a hot stimulus to the hand causes a feeling of pain which leads to 
  withdrawal of the limb; he calls this "the standard view."  In the second, 
  the stimulus causes the pain and the withdrawal in parallel; he calls this 
  (correctly) the epiphenomenalist view.  The fact is: the second has been 
  "the standard view" for over a century.  The withdrawal is a spinal reflex 
  and the pain is epiphenomenal for the behavior, though likely not for the 
  memory of the occasion (Clark and Squire, 1998). 
 
  The reader will have by now recognized some of my preconceptions about  
  consciousness: 
  1) there is such a thing.  We routinely ascribe consciousness to some  
  entities and not others and with fairly widespread agreement.  
  Moreover, we label levels of consciousness for both diagnostic and  
  therapeutic purposes, again with fairly good agreement. 
  2) consciousness depends upon brains and is to be understood (so far  
  as we can) in naturalistic terms.  Weiskrantz in LOST AND FOUND  
  thoroughly agrees with these two claims.  However, there is a third  
  preconception which he avoids. 
  3) whatever the mechanism producing consciousness, it exists in  
  duplicate.  In each hemisphere exists the machinery for consciousness.  
  Of course, Weiskrantz knows that almost all cerebral anatomy exists in  
  pairs; it is obvious in any frontal or horizontal section of the  
  cerebrum.  However, he gives this readily observable fact short shrift  
  and he never connects it explicitly with the problem of consciousness.   
  Is the duality of anatomy like the runners of a sleigh, such that if  
  one is damaged or removed the sleigh cannot go?  or is the duality  
  more like two harnessed horses, such that if one is removed, the  
  remaining member of the pair can still pull the sleigh, not as fast or  
  as far, but enough.  The answer unquestionably is the latter.   
  Otherwise hemispherectomy would not have become a routine procedure in  
  18 of 25 epilepsy centers (Engel, 1993). Not only is the cerebral  
  anatomy double, and not only is it unarguable that one hemisphere is  
  enough for consciousness; beyond that, two hemispheres following  
  callosotomy have been shown to be conscious 
  simultaneously and independently.   As Nagel (1971) said of the 
  split-brain, "what the right hemisphere can do on its own is too  
  elaborate, too intentionally directed, and too psychologically  
  intelligible to be regarded merely as a collection of unconscious 
  automatic responses" (p. 403).   And, "if the patients did not deny 
  awareness of what is being done [by their right hemispheres] no doubts  
  about their consciousness would arise at all" (p. 404).  This 1971  
  paper by Nagel is not included in DEBATES. 
 
  Much of the meandering inconclusiveness of discussions on  
  consciousness results from so many different usages of the word.   
  However, almost all usages have in common the idea of subjectivity.   
  Hence, I 
  believe: 
  4) Explaining subjectivity should have priority.  Finding a 
  physiologic basis for subjectivity is hard enough (cf. Dave Chalmers in 
  Chap. 22) without trying to explain all the other different stuff that 
  people mean or might mean when they say "consciousness." 
 
  5) Mammalian brains have considerable power for generalized  
  computation but special functions (e.g., subjectivity) commonly  
  require specialized structures.  Such an hypothesized structure has  
  been facetiously 
termed a "subjectivity pump" by Marcel Kinsbourne (1995).  Well, that's exactly what some of us 
  are looking for.  And the mechanism for subjectivi ty is double, as  
  shown by the duality of the anatomy, the success of hemispherectomy  
  and the split brain results (in cats and monkeys as well as humans). 
 
  One of the few philosophers to thoroughly consider the split-brain  
  data was Nagel (1971).  He emphasized a crucial consideration:  "It  
  may be impossible for us to abandon certain ways of conceiving and  
  representing ourselves, no matter how little support they get from  
  scientific research. This, I suspect, is true of the idea of the unity  
  of a person."  Having described the split-brain phenomena he  
  continued:  "It is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single  
  person will come to seem quaint some day . . . but it is also possible  
  that we shall be unable to abandon the idea no matter what we  
  discover" (p. 411). Furthermore, "If the idea of a single mind applies  
  to anyone it applies to ordinary individuals with intact brains, and  
  if it does not apply to them it ought to be scrapped, in which case  
  there's no point in asking whether those with split-brains have one  
  mind or two" (p. 409).  In fact, the idea of a single mind applies  
  exactly to an individual who has had a hemispherectomy (Bogen, 1977,  
  1997a).  But Nagel was oblivious to consciousness after  
  hemispherectomy, and in this he has all of the authors in both of  
  these books for company. 
 
  One can ask, "Will reading this book increase my understanding of  
  consciousness?"  LOST AND FOUND is essential reading for those  
  concerned with blindsight.  However it can not yet answer a basic  
  question: why do we need striate cortex to be conscious of what we are  
  seeing?  Is it because striate cortex gets back the visual information  
  from all of the cortical areas that process visual information?  Or  
  does it send along to the other areas some special code which does not  
  accompany the visual information that reaches extra-striate cortex  
  directly from LGN or pulvinar?  Or does striate cortex send back to  
  some subcortical region something that is crucial for subjectivity?   
  This is the alternative which I favor and it appears to be the  
  alternative favored in LOST AND FOUND in which Weiskrantz ascribes the  
  availability to consciousness of visual information to a VORB.  By  
  VORB, he means "visual oil refinery bypass." This refers to pathways  
  that bypass the well known block diagram of visual hierarchy proposed  
  by Felleman and van Essen (1991), which in LOST AND FOUND is called  
  (after Cowey) the "visual oil refinery." 
 
  In Part II of Henry VI,  Dick says, "First, . . . kill all the  
  lawyers."  Why not dispose of lawyers?  Because the rule of long  
  evolved law stands between us and reversion to the inquisition, trial  
  by combat and the dunking of witches, who were proved innocent only if  
  they drowned. Well then, from what primitive practices are we  
  protected by philosophers? A likely answer: unexamined beliefs.  We  
  benefit from their exposure of unrecognized assumptions and  
  undisciplined argument.  However, to be truly helpful, they've got to  
  know the territory.  Judging by DEBATES, what many philosophers  
  currently have to say leads less to a clarification of consciousness  
  than to its elaborate obfuscation. A bit more gentle opinion was  
  expressed by Crick and Koch (1998). "...while philosophers have, in  
  the past, raised interesting questions and pointed to possible  
  conceptual confusions, they have a very poor record, historically, at  
  arriving at valid scientific answers" (p103). One frustrated  
  scientist's opinion was less generous. In his chapter in what 
remains one 
  of the best books ever about consciousness, A.E.Fessard wrote, " ...we  
  doubt that epistemological discussions and metaphysical hypotheses,  
  which in this field cannot be easily avoided, can ever be of real  
  utility. By their 
subtleties and intricacies of points of view, by the fallacy of certain analogies, the mixture of facts 
with respectable but unverifiable beliefs, they have obscured, more often than clarified, the naive 
notion every normal man has of  his own consciousness."(p201. 
 
  Perhaps the last word in this review should be left to a professional  
  philosopher: Because I believe consciousness requires brain, it seems  
  to me that before people go on about consciousness, they should know  
  something about brain.  I asked my cousin Jim Bogen, a Philosophy  
  Professor,  "If someone wants to philosophize about quantum mechanics,  
  shouldn't  he  know how to do QM first?".  "The good ones do", Jim  
  replied.  "Well then, if someone wants to philosophize about 
  consciousness--- He interrupted, "They should be conscious". 
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